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Abstract
We present a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency parameters
which is able to capture the influence of risk-taking on bank efficiency and that
distingues those effects among banks with different characteristics. Cost and profit
efficiency are found to be over- and underestimated when risk measures are not
accurately modeled. We find that more capitalized banks are more cost and profit
efficient, while banks assuming more credit risk are less cost efficient but more
profit efficient. The magnitude of these effects vary with bank’s size and affilia-
tion. Liquidity is found to affect cost efficiency only for domestic banks. Large
and foreign banks benefit more from higher credit and market risk exposures,
while small and domestic banks find more advantageous to be more capitalized.
We identify some channels that explain these differences and provide insights for
macroprudential regulation.
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1. Introduction
The modern banking theory shows that banks’ behavior is subject to un-
certainty derived from the behavior of borrowers, depositors and financial mar-
kets in which banks interact. This type of uncertainty is commonly referred as
bank risk-taking. That is, the amount of risk that banks are willing to tolerate,
which depends on competition, regulation and corporate governance (see Boyd and
De Nicoló, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Wagner, 2010). In their pursuit of better
performance banks tend to engage in more risk-taking. However, excessive risk-
taking lead the financial system to be highly vulnerable to shocks (Rajan, 2006).
During the global financial crisis of 2007-08 excessive bank risk-taking was asso-
ciated with banking runs, fire-sales, and financial fragility (see Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). In response to this behavior, bank-
ing regulators have imposed higher capital and liquidity requirements, leverage
ratios, and countercyclical provisions for loan losses, among other regulatory mea-
sures (see Basel III standards BIS, 2010). Thus, understanding how risk-taking
and regulation influences banks performance is a recent concern in the banking
literature.
Several studies accounting for regulatory effects have found that stringency of
capital regulation is associated with higher bank efficiency, while limiting banking
activities discourages efficiency (see Chortareas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013;
Berger and Bowman, 2013). Other studies have focused on identifying the rela-
tionship between credit risk, capitalization and bank efficiency (see the seminal
work of Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Most of studies exploring these relationships
have found that well-capitalized banks are more cost efficient than banks with
low capitalization (see Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008;
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Furthermore, banks with low cost efficiency have been
found to exhibit higher proportions of bad loans and to be more prone to default
(see Podpiera and Weill, 2008; Tabak et al., 2011, for some evidence from emerging
economies).
From the banking production approach (or the so called structural approach),
risk-taking has been identified as a crucial element of the banking production pro-
cess which should be properly modeled into efficiency measurement (Hughes et al.,
2001). Recent studies under this approach show that failing to account for risk-
taking leads to biased estimations of bank efficiency as well as misleading estimates
of scale economies and cost elasticities (Hughes and Mester, 2013; Koetter, 2008;
Malikov et al., 2014).
Another widely used approach in the literature is to incorporate risk measures
into frontier efficiency methods such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Under
this approach, Radić et al. (2012) find capital and liquidity risk to have relevant
effects on cost and profit efficiency of investment banks in G-7 countries. Also,
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Pessarossi and Weill (2014) find that increases of capital ratios during 2004-2009
had a positive influence on cost efficiency of Chinese banks, suggesting that capital
requirements may improve cost efficiency. Overall, these studies reveal that ac-
counting for risk-exposure heterogeneity across banks is relevant when measuring
bank efficiency. However, most of studies modeling the effects of risk on efficiency
under this approach incorporate only proxies of credit risk and omit other im-
portant risks faced by banks (i.e. liquidity, market or insolvency risk). Moreover,
omitting heterogeneity sources related to size and type of ownership has been iden-
tified to lead to biased estimations of bank efficiency (Bos et al., 2009; Feng and
Zhang, 2012; Goddard et al., 2014).
Identifying inefficiency determinants and accounting for heterogeneity is par-
ticularly important in the Colombian banking sector given the rapid expansion
of the sector in recent years, the important role of foreign institutions and the
several mergers and acquisition (M&A) processes that have been carried out.
These characteristics have increased the differences in terms of size and capital
structure across institutions, which could affect banks’ risk-taking behavior and
performance. Furthermore, since 2002 several regulatory measures have been im-
plemented by the Colombian regulators in order to enhance provisions for loan
losses, and to set adequate capital and liquidity requirements to limit risk-taking.
These measures were initially motivated by a profound financial crisis at the end
of 1990’s that evidenced the vulnerability of the Colombian banking sector to ex-
ternal shocks. Previous studies, although failing to control by risk, have found
gains in efficiency of Colombian banks in recent years and have identified that
large and foreign banks are more efficient than their counterparts. In this context,
recognizing differences in the way risk exposure affects different types of banks
becomes relevant in order to get more accurate efficiency estimations and a com-
plete understanding of the effects of risk and macroprudential regulation on banks
performance.
The aim of this paper is to identify the influence of risk-taking on cost and profit
efficiency of banks and to differentiate these effects between banks with different
size and affiliation. We contribute to the literature by proposing a stochastic
frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients, which is able to identify the
influence of unobserved heterogeneity sources related to risk-taking on cost and
profit efficiency of different types of banks. In particular, we analyze these effects
on banks with different size and affiliation and account for capital, credit, liquidity
and market risk exposures.1 The model is estimated for the Colombian banking
sector using bank-level data for the period 2002-2012. The inference of the model is
1In contrast to the approach followed in Pessarossi and Weill (2014), we perform the analysis
a posteriori after allowing for bank-specific coefficients instead of estimating interactions.
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carried out via Bayesian methods that allows us to formally incorporate parameter
uncertainty and to derive bank-specific distributions of efficiency and risk random
coefficients.
The rest of this paper contains five additional sections. In Section 2 we describe
the Colombian banking sector performance and regulation. Section 3 presents
the proposed specification, the Bayesian inference, comparison criteria and the
empirical models. Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5 we present and analyze
the main results. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses some regulatory
implications.
2. The Colombian banking sector: performance and regulation
During early 1990s the Colombian banking sector was gradually introduced
into the global economy by a financial liberalization program following the trend
of other Latin-American economies (Carvalho et al., 2009). The program eased
restrictions for foreign participation in the banking sector, established a kind of
universal banking scheme intended to reduce specialization, and implemented fi-
nancial regulatory measures to promote competition and efficiency in the financial
sector.2 As a result, by 1997 most of state-owned banks were privatized. The
share of public banks in the financial system’ assets dropped from 43% to 13%,
the number of financial institutions grew from 91 in 1990 to 155 in 1997 and the
ratio of credit to GDP increased from 30% to 44% (Uribe and Vargas, 2002).
Evidence has shown that the financial liberalization process in Colombia had
positive consequences by increasing competition and efficiency, lowering interme-
diation costs and improving loan quality. However, after some years the greater
competition with foreign banks resulted in higher risk levels and a subsequent
deterioration of loans quality, especially among domestic banks (Barajas et al.,
2002). In 1999 the Colombian banking sector was affected by local and external
shocks that triggered the financial conditions in the sector and lead to a profound
financial crisis. The external shock from the Asian financial crisis led to capital
outflows and a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate. At local level, an eco-
nomic downturn, and the raise of real interest rates forced to a rapid deterioration
of loan quality that eroded the solvency of the sector. Previous studies reveal
that this rapid deterioration of the financial sector was mainly a consequence of
low provisions for loan losses and modest bank capitalization (Gomez-Gonzalez,
2009). Between 1998 and 2001 several banking institutions failed, and other were
merged. Institutions specialized in mortgage loans were absorbed by large com-
mercial banks. In consequence, the number of banking institutions felt from 100
2Colombian banks are not allowed to offer some financial services that are included in the
standard universal banking approach such as insurance and trust activities.
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in 1998 to 57 in 2001; while the annual rate of credit growth declined from 30%
to -6% during the same period.
Following the financial crisis, Colombian financial authorities strengthened the
regulatory measures intended to enhance adequate provisions for loan losses, and
higher capital and liquidity ratios. These regulatory measures were designed under
the Basel standards with the aim of accounting for the interaction of credit risk
with liquidity and market risk.
Since 2002, risky loans (based on internal loans ratings) were designated as the
target measure to set banks provisions for loan losses, rather than the traditional
non-performing loans (NPLs). Thus, loan provisions were settled on an ex-ante
measure of credit risk instead of being computed using an ex-post measure of
credit risk (i.e NPLs).3 Market risk was defined as an estimated value by each
bank using the Value at Risk (VaR) of its securities portfolio, which was included
as an additional component in the capital ratio since 2008. Hence, the higher
the market exposure the larger the required capital for the solvency ratio.4 New
definitions of equity capital were also implemented to enhance quality of capital
(Tier 1 and Tier 2). Finally, a short-run liquidity ratio (LR) was required for
banks to hedge from liquidity mismatches.5
Overall, the above-mentioned regulatory measures have served to influence
banks behavior due to the incorporation of risk-taking. These measures along
with other macroprudential policies implemented in 2006-07 played an important
role to avoid the contagion from the global financial crisis of 2007-08.6 Neverthe-
less, as we show further, an important decrease in both cost and profit efficiency
was observed during that period, especially for small and foreign banks.
During the period 2002-2012 the Colombian banking sector experienced a grow-
ing expansion that has been accompanied by the arrival of foreign banks. The ag-
gregated value of loans grew 300% and the ratio of investments to assets doubled.
Banks increased their competition in the securities market with non-banking in-
stitutions (i.e. Brokerage firms) and also boosted their participation in the money
market for short-term liquidity. Several M&A processes were also carried out, con-
3Provisions vary according to borrowers rating from 1% for type A borrowers up to 20% for
type E borrowers.
4Capital ratio (CR) should be greater than 9% and is defined as equity capital (CE) over risky
weighted assets (RWA) plus 100/9 of the (VaR). Formally, CR = CE/[RWA + (100/9)(V aR)],
where CR > 9%.
5LR is the value of liquid assets over short-term liabilities. LR should be positive for maturities
of 7 and 30 days, although it can be negative for 14 days maturities in order to account for the
reserve requirement that banks have to fulfill every two weeks. Previous to LR, regulators used
a ratio of liquid assets over volatile liabilities.
6The government settled limits to banks positions in foreign currency and extended to two
years the period for allowing foreign capital outflows.
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centrating financial services in few but large institutions. As a result, risk exposure
presented important increases.7 This has required the regulator to monitor closely
credit and market risk and to face the challenges of systemic financial institutions
(see León et al., 2012).
Figure 1: Evolution of risk exposure measures by type of bank 2002 - 2012























































































Figure 1 shows the evolution of the credit, liquidity, capital and market risk
measures over the period 2002-2012 by distinguishing between small and large
banks and foreign and domestic banks.8 We observe that the ratio of risky loans
over total loans has declined for all banks although large and domestic banks
exhibit higher levels than small and foreign banks. The ratio of liquid assets over
total assets has gradually increased over time, specially for large and foreign banks.
Capital ratio seems to be stable for large banks in Colombia while increasing for
small and foreign banks. This is more evident during the 2007-08 period coinciding
with the global financial crisis (see Berger and Bowman, 2013, for similar findings
in the US banking sector). The ratio of securities over total assets has declined
7In May 2013, Colombian Treasury Bill (TES) prices decreased 20% in two weeks as a result
of the uncertainty related to FED’s exit strategy. This downward trend led to bank losses of
COP 2.32 billion that represented 4.87% of their equity capital.
8We define small and large banks as those below and above the median of the total assets
level, respectively.
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over the period, but large and foreign banks have a greater activity in security
markets.
2.1. Efficiency of the Colombian banking sector
Early studies of banking efficiency have found evidence of low cost efficiency
in the Colombian banking sector during the 90’s although some improvements
during the first half of 2000s in merged banks (Estrada and Osorio, 2004; Clavijo
et al., 2006). Recent studies have evidenced improvements in technical efficiency
and productivity in the sector but large heterogeneity among banks. Sarmiento
et al. (2013), using a non-parametric frontier model, found that Colombian banks
improved in technical efficiency from 2000 up to the global financial crisis of 2007-
08, when efficiency and productivity decreased. They also found M&A to have a
significant and positive impact on bank efficiency, and high heterogeneity in ef-
ficiency irrespective of banks’ size and affiliation. Galán et al. (2015) estimated
input-oriented technical efficiency during the period 2000-2009 using a dynamic
Bayesian SFA model. They find out that foreign ownership has positive and per-
sistent effects on efficiency of Colombian banks, while the effects of size are positive
but rapidly adjusted. They also identified high inefficiency persistence and impor-
tant differences between institutions. In particular, merged banks were found to
exhibit low costs of adjustment that allowed them to recover rapidly the efficiency
losses derived from merging processes.
Finally, Moreno and Estrada (2013) studied the role of market power in ex-
plaining efficiency gains in Colombian banks during the 2004-2012 period. By using
alternative SFA and non-parametric models, they found a positive relationship be-
tween market power and efficiency, which is explained by product differentiation
that allows banks to gain efficiency while they do not charge excessive credit prices.
However, previous applications have not studied the influence of risk-taking on the
efficiency of Colombian banks.
3. Methodology
Frontier efficiency methods have become a very important tool to identify rel-
evant bank inefficiency drivers and to provide useful indicators of performance of
the sector and individual institutions. In particular, SFA, firstly introduced by
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), presents the advan-
tages of allowing inferences on the parameters, accounting for idiosyncratic errors
and modeling firm characteristics that affect directly the inefficiency in a single
stage.9 In this context, bank characteristics related to their risk exposures can be
9In contrast, the main nonparametric method of Data Envelopment Analysis is more flexible
but provides, in general, deterministic measures of inefficiency and does not allow accounting for
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easily and consistently accounted for in cost and profit efficiency estimations.
3.1. Heterogeneity and risk in bank efficiency measurement
Distinguishing inefficiency from heterogeneity is an important issue in the ef-
ficiency frontier literature. Omitting heterogeneity variables has been identified
to lead to biased estimations of inefficiency (see Greene, 2005). In the banking
literature, Bos et al. (2009) identify these effects on efficiency levels and rankings
when observed heterogeneity is omitted. In particular, in the case of risk exposure,
Radić et al. (2012) evaluate a sample of 800 investment banks of G-7 countries
during the period 2001-2007 and find that omitting bank risk-taking from effi-
ciency estimations leads to underestimating profit efficiency. The authors also find
liquidity and capital risk exposures to be the most relevant factors determining
cost and profit inefficiency.
Unobserved heterogeneity has also been found to affect estimations from stochas-
tic frontier models. In the banking sector, Feng and Zhang (2012) find that fail-
ure to consider unobserved heterogeneity results in misleading efficiency rankings
and mismeasured technical efficiency, productivity growth, and returns to scale.10
Williams (2012) estimates a model where the scale parameter of a half-normal
distributed inefficiency is assumed to follow a random structure that accounts for
bank size interactions. However, the author estimates a second stage where cost
efficiency is regressed on a market power index and other bank characteristics,
which may suggest that the initial efficiency scores are biased and inconsistent
(Wang and Schmidt, 2002). Our proposal is intended to model unobserved het-
erogeneity sources related to risk exposure and accounting for bank characteristics
in a single stage.
3.2. A stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients
Since we are interested in identifying unobserved heterogeneity related to the
effects of risk on bank inefficiency, we propose a stochastic frontier model where the
coefficients of risk-exposure measures in the inefficiency distribution are modeled
as bank-specific parameters. The proposed specification is the following:
yit = xitβ + vit − uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ Exp(λit)






inefficiency heterogeneity in a consistent single stage.
10Greene (2005) proposes different methods to deal with this kind of heterogeneity under the
frequentist approach. In the Bayesian context, Galán et al. (2014) propose the inclusion of a
random parameter that can be modeled along with other observed covariates and which is found
to perform well in capturing latent heterogeneity.
8
where yit represents the output for firm i at time t, xit is a row vector that contains
the input quantities, β is a vector of parameters, vit is an idiosyncratic error
assumed to follow a normal distribution, and uit is the inefficiency component. The
inefficiency is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with a firm specific
and time-varying parameter λit, γ is a vector of parameters which are common
to all firms, including the constant and, γ∗i is a vector of firm-specific parameters
intended to capture differences in the effects of covariates across firms on the
inefficiency. Therefore, zit is a vector of heterogeneity variables whose effects
are assumed to be constant across firms, and z∗it contains a set of heterogeneity
variables with bank-specific effects.
This specification with random coefficients in the parameter of the inefficiency
distribution is flexible in the sense that some covariates can be associated to firm
specific coefficients while other heterogeneity variables may be modeled with fixed
coefficients. In particular, the random coefficients are intended to capture differ-
ences in the way risk exposure affects efficiency of different types of banks. Thus,
the model is able to identify not only the effects of risk on inefficiency but also the
type of banks that are more affected by each of the risk exposure measures.
3.3. Bayesian inference
The inference of the model is carried out using Bayesian methods. This ap-
proach was introduced in stochastic frontier models by van den Broeck et al. (1994)
and allows us to formally incorporate parameter uncertainty and to derive poste-
rior densities of cost and profit efficiency for every individual bank.
We assume proper but relatively disperse prior distributions throughout. In
particular, the distributions assumed for the parameters in the frontier are: β ∼
N(0,Σβ) where Σ
−1
β is a precision diagonal matrix with priors set to 0.001 for all
coefficients. The variance of the idiosyncratic error term is inverse gamma, that
is equivalent to σ−2v ∼ G(aσ−2v , bσ−2v ) with priors set to 0.01 for the shape and rate
parameters, respectively.
Regarding the inefficiency component, its distribution is assumed to be ex-
ponential: uit|γ,γ∗, zit, z∗it ∼ Exp(exp(zitγ + z∗itγ∗i )). The prior distribution of
the vector of common parameters is γ ∼ N(0,Σγ) with priors for the diagonal
precision matrix Σ−1γ equal to 0.1 for all the coefficients. For the firm-specific
inefficiency heterogeneity coefficients, a hierarchical structure is defined, where
γ∗i ∼ N(γ∗,Σγ∗) and γ∗ is defined in the same way as γ. Sensitivity anal-
ysis is performed to the use of an exponential prior distribution for the ineffi-
ciency parameters. In this case they are chosen to be centered in a given prior
mean efficiency value r∗ following the procedure in Griffin and Steel (2007), where
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exp(γ) ∼ Exp(− ln r∗).11 Results show convergence to roughly the same values
after the number of iterations described below.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and in particular the Gibbs
Sampling algorithm with data augmentation, as presented by Koop et al. (1995)
for stochastic frontier models, can be used here.12 The MCMC algorithm involves
50,000 iterations where the first 10,000 are discarded and a thinning equal to 4
is used to remove autocorrelations. Therefore, 10,000 iterations are used for the
posterior inference.
We assess the fit and predictive performance of the different models using a
version of the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) called DIC3 and the Log Pre-
dictive Score (LPS) (see Griffin and Steel, 2004; Galán et al., 2014, for applications
of these criteria to Bayesian SFA models). The former is a stable variant of the
within sample measure of fit introduced by Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) commonly
used in Bayesian analysis. Defining the deviance of a model with parameters θ as
D(θ) = −2 log f(y|θ), where y is the data, then DIC = 2D(θ)−D(θ̄). However,
using an estimator of the density f(y|θ) instead of the posterior mean θ̄ is more
stable. This alternative specification presented by Celeux et al. (2006) overcomes
robustness problems when the original DIC is implemented to random effects and
mixture models. The formulation for this criterion is:
DIC3 = −4Eθ[log f(y|θ)|y] + 2 log f̂ (y) (2)
Regarding LPS, it is a criterion for evaluating the out-of-sample behaviour
of different models. This criterion was first introduced by Good (1952) and is
intended to examine model performance by comparing its predictive distribution
with out-of-sample observations. For this purpose the sample is split into a training
and a prediction set. Our prediction set consists of observations corresponding to
the last two observed years of every firm in the sample, and the training set contains





log f(yi,ti |previous data), (3)
where yi,ti represents the observations in the predictive set for the k firms in the
sample and ti represents the penultimate time point with observed data for firm i.
11r∗ is set at 0.65, following other Bayesian SFA studies in banking (see Tabak and Tecles,
2010).
12The implementation of our models is carried out using the WinBUGS package (see Griffin
and Steel, 2007, for a general procedure).
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3.4. Translog cost and profit models
We use cost and profit functions for the frontier specification in (1), and we
represent them with translog multi-product functions. The estimated model is:
ln cit = β0 +
∑M
m=1 βm ln ymit +
∑R






















m=1 φmt ln ymit +
∑R
r=1 ϕrt ln prit + vit + uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ exp(λit)









where cit is the total cost or the total profit, y are outputs, p are input prices and
t is a time trend in order to account for technological change. We also account
for two types of heterogeneity variables affecting cost and profit inefficiency: A
group of bank characteristics modeled in z, which are assumed to have common
effects on all banks, and a group of variables z∗, capturing banks’ risk-exposure in
the previous period and allowed to have specific effects on the inefficiency of each
bank. In order to overcome the problem of calculations of logarithms of negative
profits, we correct profit values by a factor corresponding to the absolute value
of the lowest profit plus one (see Tecles and Tabak, 2010). Linear homogeneity
of the cost function is achieved by normalizing total costs and input prices by a
chosen input price. Symmetry of the cross-effects is accomplished by imposing
βmn = βnm, δrs = δsr. In the case of the profit function the sign of the inefficiency
component u is reversed.
From (4) cost/profit efficiency of individual banks in each period is computed
as:
CEit = exp(−uit). (5)
Returns to scale (RTS) can be derived from the cost function as the sum of









where a RTS measure less than 1 indicates that the production technology present
decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, increasing returns to scale are
observed if the RTS measure is larger than 1, while if it is equal to 1 it indicates
constant returns to scale.
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We employ annual data from 31 commercial banks for the period 2002-2012.
This is an unbalanced panel data set from the local central bank (Banco de la
República) and the financial supervisory agency (Superintendencia Financiera de
Colombia). We follow the financial intermediation approach in which banks em-
ploy deposits, labor and physical capital to produce loans, securities investments
and other financial services.13 We consider as input prices: the price of deposits
(p1), which is the ratio of interest expenses divided by total deposits; the price of
labor (p2), which is personnel expenses divided by the total number of employees,
and the price of physical capital (p3), which is calculated as the ratio of oper-
ating expenses (i.e. non-interest reduced by personnel) to total fixed assets. As
outputs we consider: loans (y1) including consumer, commercial, mortgage, and
microcredit; securities (y2), which includes public and private bonds holdings, and
other securities investments; and off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities (y3) measured
as the ratio of non-interest income over total income. Non-interest income includes
securitization, brokerage services, and management of financial assets for clients,
which represent an important source of income for Colombian banks.14 Total costs
are considered as the sum of interest and non-interest costs and total profit as the
earned net profit.
We consider two bank-specific characteristics with common effects on the in-
efficiency of all banks. Those are, size (z1), measured as the level of total assets;
and foreign ownership (z2), which is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if more
than 50% of bank shares are foreign owned, and 0 otherwise. As aforementioned,
these effects have been found to be relevant inefficiency drivers in previous studies.
As risk exposure measures with heterogeneous effects on bank-specific inef-
ficiency, we include measures of credit risk, liquidity, capital and market risk in
accordance Colombian financial regulation and the Basel III standards. Credit risk
(z∗1) is measured as risky loans over total loans.
15 This measure of ex-ante credit
13Hughes and Mester (1993) provide evidence that confirm that deposits should be treated as
inputs (see Sealey and Lindley, 1977, for a discussion on the intermediation approach).
14In a recent study, Tabak and Tecles (2010) find that omitting OBS as an output over-
(under-)estimate cost (profit) efficiency results.
15Risky loans are based on internal loan ratings performed by banks according the Colombian
regulation. This measure of ex-ante credit risk has been used before in the literature to identify
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risk may avoid biased efficiency estimations that have been identified when using
ex-post credit risk measures such as NPLs (see Malikov et al., 2014). Liquidity (z∗2)
is measured as the ratio of liquid assets over total assets, where liquid assets include
cash holdings, negotiable and available to sell public and private debt instruments
and pledged collateral in repurchase agreement operations. Capitalization (z∗3) is
measured as the ratio of capital equity over total assets. Finally, market risk expo-
sure (z∗4) is measured as securities investments over total assets. All risk variables
are included lagged one-period in order to account for inter-temporal effects on
inefficiency and avoid reverse causality.
Table 1 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables described above,
where all monetary values are expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars at constant
prices of the year 2012.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Total loans 3,342,012 4,206,436 11,553 28,267,020
Securities 1,265,349 1,339,794 563 6,461,458
OBS 0.0354 0.0299 0.0266 0.0587
Price of deposits 0.0248 0.0121 0.0009 0.0923
Price of labour 36.44 22.30 3.13 142.03
Price of capital 1.92 2.66 0.29 17.30
Total assets 5,503,680 6,425,746 39,699 41,786,469
Credit risk exposure 0.0988 0.0667 0.0019 0.3839
Liquidity ratio 0.2296 0.0945 0.0377 0.8226
Capital ratio 0.1211 0.0757 0.0448 0.7854
Market risk exposure 0.2381 0.1368 0.0013 0.7478
Total cost 1,132,776 1,402,621 15,673 7,722,227
Total profit 76,927 377,974 - 784,642 2,809,771
Source: Colombian central bank and financial supervisory agency.
5. Results
For comparison purposes, we estimate three different cost (C1 to C3) and
profit (P1 to P3) models from our proposed specification in (4) by including some
restrictions. Models C1 and P1 do not include risk-exposure variables in the






4i = 0. Models C2 and P2 include the risk covariates
in the inefficiency but restrict them to have a common effect on the inefficiency of














4 . Finally, our proposed specification
to model random inefficiency coefficients is estimated in models C3 and P3.
Given that our interest is to analyze the effects of size, ownership and risk-
exposure on efficiency, we present the estimation results only for the parameters in
bank risk-taking in the credit market (see Ioannidou and Penas, 2010).
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the inefficiency distribution. Tables 2 and 3, present the posterior mean and prob-
ability intervals for the parameters in the cost and profit inefficiency component,
respectively. Results for the frontier parameters are presented in the Appendix in
Tables A.1 and A.2.16
Table 2: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of parameters in the inefficiency distribu-
tion of cost models
Model C1 Model C2 Model C3
No risk covariates Common risk coefficients Random risk coefficients
Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI
γ0 1.0350 [0.0142, 0.0591] 0.9046 [0.4875, 1.4407] 0.8925 [0.4532, 1.3128]
γ1 size -0.1981 [-0.2913, -0.0820] -0.1823 [-0.3041, -0.0762] -0.1595 [-0.3070, -0.0109]
γ2 foreign -0.8144 [-1.9580, -0.0943] -0.6358 [-1.1525, -0.1482] -0.2198 [-0.4206, -0.0693]
γ∗1 credit 0.3058 [0.0845, 0.5280] 0.2863 [0.0932, 0.5816]
γ∗2 liquidity 0.2962 [-0.0598, 0.6511] -0.3511 [-0.0718, 0.7160]
γ∗3 capital -1.0823 [-1.5908, -0.5961] -1.9502 [-2.8485, -1.0214]
γ∗4 market 0.0341 [-1.0370, 1.0452] -0.0054 [-1.0517, 1.0326]
Mean efficiency 0.8934 0.8923 0.7102
s.d. efficiency 0.0653 0.1466 0.2251
DIC3 2982.76 2416.44 2005.79
LPS -9.62 -61.57 -91.79
Note: Values for γ∗1 to γ
∗
4 in Model C3 correspond to the average posterior distribution of individual coefficients.
5.1. Model comparison
Model comparison indicators lead to similar conclusions in both the cost and
profit models.17 That is, models including risk exposure measures improve from
models omitting these variables (C1 and P1). This suggests that risk-taking is an
important determinant of banks’ inefficiency. From the models considering risk
exposure, those including random coefficients for the risk covariates in the ineffi-
ciency distribution (C3 and P3) exhibits the best fit and predictive performance.
These results suggest not only that risk exposure measures are important ineffi-
ciency drivers but also that risk has different effects on cost and profit inefficiency
of banks with different characteristics. An important finding is that including risk
16From the frontier parameter estimates, it is observed that loans, investments and OBS affect
positively costs in all models as well as input prices. In the case of profits, the relationship is also
positive for loans and investments but negative, although not significant, for OBS. This result
for OBS was also found by Tabak and Tecles (2010) in an application to the Indian banking
sector. However, they found loans and investments to be not significant when OBS is included
in both cost and profit models. Regarding input prices the coefficients are not relevant in the
profit models.
17Lower values for DIC3 and LPS indicate better fit and predictive performance.
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Table 3: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the inefficiency parameter distributions
in profit models
Model P1 Model P2 Model P3
No risk covariates Common risk coefficients Random risk coefficients
Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI
γ0 -0.9668 [-2.4390, 0.3062] -1.2045 [-2.7145, 0.3825] -1.4024 [-2.9651, 0.2635]
γ1 size 0.0556 [0.0226, 0.1491] 0.0779 [0.0321, 0.1316] 0.1277 [0.0054, 0.1927]
γ2 foreign 1.0120 [0.6873, 1.3594] 1.0347 [0.6906, 1.3790] 1.0200 [0.4760, 1.5287]
γ∗1 credit -2.0264 [-2.8005, -1.3274] -1.5812 [-2.5727, -0.6431]
γ∗2 liquidity 0.1925 [-0.6021, 1.0655] 0.5437 [-0.3528, 1.3919]
γ∗3 capital -1.4811 [-2.0741, -0.6972] -1.4367 [-2.1599, -0.5821]
γ∗4 market -0.8884 [-1.5174, -0.2640] -0.9531 [-1.6614, -0.2650]
Mean efficiency 0.5150 0.6205 0.6714
s.d. efficiency 0.1638 0.2281 0.3281
DIC3 3168.01 2458.10 2360.85
LPS -180.01 -302.42 -405.94
Note: Values for γ∗1 to γ
∗
4 in Model C3 correspond to the average posterior distribution of individual coefficients.
exposure measures as inefficiency determinants and also allowing them to have
bank-specific effects on inefficiency, have important implications for efficiency es-
timations. In tables 2 and 3, we can see that the posterior mean cost and profit
efficiencies are over- underestimated, respectively, when risk exposure measures
are not modeled in the inefficiency distribution; while the dispersion increases.
This suggests that accounting for risk exposures in the inefficiency and recog-
nizing bank-specific effects of risk, identify important differences in the efficiency
among banks.
Figure 2 exhibits also differences in the predictive efficiency distributions from
the three cost and profit models. We observe that location and dispersion of the
distributions is affected. Predictive efficiency distributions from models including
risk in the inefficiency are more symmetric and the one derived from the model
with random coefficients presents less dispersion. These results evidence the im-
portance of modeling heterogeneity regarding risk exposure when estimating bank
inefficiency.
5.2. Inefficiency determinants
We observe that size and foreign ownership are important inefficiency drivers
in all the models. Their effects are negative on cost inefficiency and positive on
profit inefficiency. Previous studies have found similar effects. Chen and Liao
(2011) found that foreign banks perform better than local banks because they
may deal better with risk exposure given cheaper access to funding sources and
more diversification. Fries and Taci (2005) found similar results for banks with
a majority of foreign ownership in emerging economies. Regarding size, previous
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Figure 2: Predictive distributions of efficiency under cost and profit models


























Models with no risk-taking covariates (C1, P1), models with common risk coefficients (C2,P2) and models with
random risk coefficients (C3,P3).
studies have found that large institutions tend to exhibit greater efficiency asso-
ciated with higher scale economies (Bos and Kool, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson,
2012; Hughes and Mester, 2013). In previous applications to Colombian banks,
both foreign and large banks have also been found to be more cost efficient than
local and small banks (Moreno and Estrada, 2013; Sarmiento et al., 2013; Galán
et al., 2015).
This relative advantage of large over small banks has been recently reported
in the literature as evidence of the too-big-to-fail dilemma where larger banks
take advantage of their size to obtain funds at lower cost and to take on more
risk (Santos, 2014). Bertay et al. (2013) analyzed a large sample of banks for 90
countries during the period 1992-2011 and found that banks’ interest costs tend
to decline with systemic size.
Size and foreign ownership are also key characteristics determining the way
credit risk, liquidity, capitalization and market risk affect cost and profit efficiency.
This is identified through the random coefficient models. We analyze these effects
by type of banks (i.e. small vs large and domestic vs foreign). Figures 3 and 4
present 95% probability intervals of average posterior random coefficients by type
of bank in the cost and profit models, respectively. We observe two main results
when bank-specific coefficients are estimated: firstly, some groups of banks are
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more affected than others taking the same risk exposures; and secondly, the effects
of risk exposures become relevant as inefficiency drivers for some types of banks.
5.2.1. Credit risk
Credit risk is identified as a key determinant of both cost and profit inefficiency
though with opposite effects. While credit risk is found to have positive effects on
cost inefficiency (i.e. negative effects on cost efficiency), it affects negatively profit
inefficiency (i.e. positive effects on profit efficiency). These results are identified in
both the fixed and the random coefficients models and may suggest that assuming
higher credit risk exposures implies expending more resources on monitoring and
administering problem loans. Berger and DeYoung (1997) also found evidence
on this negative effect of problem loans on cost efficiency in U.S. banks and argue
that extra costs may be represented by additional monitoring, negotiating possible
workout arrangements, disposing collateral for possible defaults, defending bank’s
safety to the market and supervisor, and additional precautions to reserve quality
of other loans. On the other hand, in term of profits banks earn extra profits from
riskier loans and may have incentives to engage on higher credit risk.
By type of banks, we identify important differences in the way credit risk affect
efficiency. Large and domestic banks are found to be less affected in cost efficiency
by assuming the same level of credit risk. That is, it is less costly for large and
domestic banks to manage problem loans. A possible explanation could be related
to the fact that local banks have better information about borrowers which implies
that these banks may incur in lower monitoring costs. As to large banks, they may
benefit from scale economies that allows them to incur proportionally in lower costs
at the same credit risk levels. Regarding profit efficiency, large and foreign banks
benefit more from assuming similar levels of credit risk. These types of banks may
take advantage from their recognition in order to charge higher interest rates for
loans of similar quality.
5.2.2. Liquidity
Although results from our models with common coefficients suggest that liq-
uidity does not have relevant effects on efficiency of Colombian banks, the random
coefficients model identifies an important positive effect of liquidity on cost inef-
ficiency (i.e. negative effect on cost efficiency) for domestic banks. This suggests
that holding the same proportion of liquid assets is more costly for local banks.
This could be explained by the fact that foreign banks may have greater access to
interbank markets and to cheaper sources of funding (Chen and Liao, 2011). In
the case of profit efficiency, no differences are found in the way liquidity affects
efficiency of banks with different characteristics of size and ownership.
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Figure 3: 95% probability intervals of average posterior distributions of random coefficients by
type of bank in cost efficiency model C3

































We identify that higher capitalization lead to higher cost and profit efficiency.
Reasons behind these results may be derived from the agency problems between
shareholder and managers. Shareholders of highly capitalized banks have more
incentives to control better costs and capital allocation than shareholders of thinly
capitalized banks. This behavior incentivize managers to put in practice cost
reducing strategies that lead to higher efficiency. Previous studies have also found
evidence showing that highly capitalized banks tend to be more efficient than thinly
capitalized banks (see Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Hughes et al., 2001; Koetter,
2008). Berger and DeYoung (1997) also suggest an indirect effect through credit
risk. That is, highly capitalized banks have less moral hazard incentives to take
on higher risk, and therefore they will incur in less costs.
Regarding differences in the effect of capital on efficiency between banks with
different size and ownership, our results may suggest that small and domestic banks
benefit more in terms of cost efficiency. However, it is worth to notice that the
probability that these estimates are lower than those of large and foreign banks are
less than 95%. On this regard, Berger and Bowman (2013) have found that small
banks benefit more than large banks from increases in capital specially during the
financial crisis. Also, Pessarossi and Weill (2014) have found that domestic banks
in China benefit from having higher capital while the effect for foreign banks is
not significant. They argue that domestic banks in China have more government
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guarantees in case of financial distress. This would increase agency costs between
shareholders and debtholders, which would become more important than agency
costs between shareholders and managers. In terms of profit efficiency, no relevant
differences are found between banks with different characteristics.
Figure 4: 95% probability intervals of average posterior distributions of random coefficients by
groups of banks in profit efficiency model P3

































As to market risk, we find no evidence of important effects on cost inefficiency
of Colombian banks. This result holds when heterogeneous effects are accounted
for in the random coefficients models, suggesting that market risk is not a cost
efficiency determinant for any type of bank. Nevertheless, market risk have im-
portant negative effects on banks profit inefficiency (i.e. positive effects on profit
efficiency). Moreover, the random coefficients model shows strong evidence sup-
porting that these effects are more important for large and foreign banks, which
would have greater incentives to engage in more risk. Large and foreign banks
may benefit from having more diversified portfolios and access to cheaper funding
sources that allow them to get higher returns on their investments. Also, large
banks are the primary dealers of the Colombian public debt market. This con-
dition allows them to obtain higher profits by selling debt bills to small banks,
who use them as collateral to obtain liquidity from the central bank and from the
secured money market.
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5.3. Efficiency, technical change and returns to scale
The evolution of cost and profit efficiency over time is presented in Figure
5 by groups of banks. We observe that large and foreign banks exhibit higher
costs efficiency levels than small and local banks. A possible explanation for the
differences between banks with different size may be related to the fact that large
banks might be considered by creditors as too-big-to-fail, which allows them to
have access to cheaper funding sources. Small banks have been more volatile in
both cost and profit efficiency over time, specially after the global financial crisis,
while large banks have been more stable and present higher cost efficiency over the
whole period. This may suggest that large banks are less sensitive to environmental
conditions, possibly due to more stable funding sources. In the case of small banks
the result can be seen as opposite in the sense that creditors and depositors may
ask for higher returns from those banks as a way to exert market discipline (see
evidence in Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Bertay et al., 2013; Hughes and Mester,
2013).
Regarding ownership, although foreign banks present higher cost efficiency than
local banks, in terms of profit efficiency they exhibit lower scores and much more
volatility over the whole period. The highest difference is observed in 2008 coin-
ciding with the global financial crisis. This suggests that foreign institutions were
more affected due to their operations and investments in international markets.
Nevertheless, in the last few years, foreign banks have improved and exhibit an
increasing trend in profit efficiency.
Finally, we compute technical change and returns to scale from Model C3 and
report the results in Table 4 by groups of banks with similar characteristics of size
and ownership. In general, we observe technical progress for all types of banks
but specially for large and domestic institutions. This can be a consequence of the
reorganization processes that these types of institutions have carried out during
the period including several M&A. Regarding returns to scale, decreasing returns
are observed in the Colombian banking sector, which may suggest low margin for
more M&A processes. However, some important differences are found when the
analysis is performed by groups of banks. We find that while large and domestic
institutions operate at decreasing returns to scale, small and foreign banks exhibit
increasing returns to scale. These results coincide with those reported by Galán
et al. (2015), who suggest that M&A processes carried out mainly by domestic and
large institutions may lead them to be oversized, while small and foreign banks
may still present some potential scale gains. Furthermore, the fact that large banks
exhibit decreasing returns to scale may confirm that their efficiency gains obey to
external sources such as lower funding costs (i.e. deposits, subordinated debt or
interbank loans) as a result of implicit government guarantees. On this regard,
Davies and Tracey (2014) have found that large banks benefit from subsidies and
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Figure 5: Evolution of mean posterior cost and profit efficiency by groups of banks in random
coefficient models






























































that suppressing them makes scale economies disappear.
Table 4: TC and RTS by type of bank





All banks 0.0456 0.9618
6. Concluding remarks
Risk-taking is an inherent condition of the banking business. However, tradi-
tional studies on bank efficiency had assumed that risk is incorporated into bank
output without explicitly modeling its role in explaining inefficiency. Recent stud-
ies show that failing to account for risk-taking leads to biased estimations of bank
efficiency as well as misleading estimates of scale economies and cost elasticities.
Likewise, the literature has focused mainly on credit risk, omitting other important
risks faced by banks.
We present a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients,
which is able to capture unobserved heterogeneity related to credit, liquidity, cap-
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ital and market risk exposures. It also provides the first empirical evidence on
the role of bank risk-taking in the inefficiency of the Colombian banking indus-
try. Recent studies on efficiency of the Colombian banking sector have showed
improvements in technical efficiency and productivity among banks. However,
none of these studies have incorporated the impact of bank risk-taking behavior
on inefficiency, which plays a major role in banking production.
Our findings remark the importance of accounting for size, affiliation and risk
exposure in the estimation of banks efficiency. Cost and profit efficiency are found
to be over- underestimated when risk measures are not accurately modeled. More-
over, size and foreign ownership are found to be not only important determinants
of efficiency but also key characteristics determining the way credit risk, liquidity,
capitalization and market risk affect cost and profit efficiency.
We find that higher credit risk exposures lead to lower cost efficiency given
greater expenditures on monitoring and administering problem loans. However,
our findings suggest that these costs are lower for large and domestic banks. Large
banks may benefit from scale economies that allows them to incur proportionally
in lower costs at the same credit risk levels, while local banks may incur in lower
monitoring costs given that they have better information about borrowers. We
also find credit risk to be associated with higher profit efficiency and that large
and foreign banks benefit more from assuming similar levels of credit risk.
We also find evidence to support the hypothesis that capital requirements may
contribute to enhance banking efficiency. We identify that more capitalization
leads to higher efficiency in both costs and profits, specially for small and do-
mestic banks. This can be related to agency problems between shareholders and
managers. Shareholders of highly capitalized banks have more incentives to con-
trol better costs and capital allocation, while managers of these institutions have
less moral hazard incentives to take on higher credit risk.
Our results also identify positive effects of market risk on profit efficiency.
In particular, large and foreign institutions have greater incentives to engage in
more market risk. These types of banks may benefit from having more diversified
portfolios and access to cheaper funding sources that allow them to get higher
returns on their investments. Large banks also benefit from being the primary
dealers of the Colombian public debt market which enhances their gains from the
trading activity in this market.
Finally, large banks were found to present higher efficiency than small institu-
tions and to be less affected by the financial crisis. Moreover, the fact that large
banks are found to face lower costs and to have incentives to take on more risk in
credit and securities constitutes a signal for regulators to monitor closely the be-
havior of these type of banks and their riskiness. Regulators should also consider
alternative measures to limit risk-taking incentives associated with the fact that
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large banks may benefit from being considered as too-big-to-fail. Work is currently
in progress on the relationship between risk-taking and the too-big-to-fail dilemma
in interbank markets.
Overall, banks’ cost and profit efficiency measures that account for risk-taking
may constitute a useful indicator for financial stability considerations given that
banks with lower efficiency have been found to be more prone to future bank fails
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Podpiera and Weill, 2008). In this context, regula-
tors should be aware not only of the consequences of macroprudential regulation
on banks performance, but also of the different effects that polices intended to
discourage risk exposure and those on capital and liquidity requirements have on
banks with different characteristics.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of frontier parameter distributions in
cost models
Model C1 Model C2 Model C3
No risk covariates Common risk coefficients Random risk coefficients
Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI
β0 9.789 [-3.249,24.840] 3.698 [-9.591,20.04] 7.205 [-1.754,18.03]
β1 3.025 [0.6511,5.195] 4.031 [1.639,6.182] 2.914 [1.242,4.282]
β2 3.391 [1.609,5.336] 4.586 [2.841,6.214] 3.538 [2.436,4.606]
β3 -0.199 [-0.391,0.013] -0.261 [-0.436,0.064] -0.212 [-0.339,0.077]
β11 -0.457 [-0.713,-0.201] -0.511 [-0.775,-0.251] -0.399 [-0.584,-0.171]
β12 0.267 [0.0725,0.459] 0.307 [0.092,0.515] 0.231 [0.052,0.388]
β13 0.017 [0.0024,0.033] 0.015 [0.004,0.027] 0.013 [0.003,0.023]
β22 0.010 [-0.108,0.146] 0.029 [-0.107,0.183] 0.048 [-0.071,0.195]
β23 -0.003 [-0.019,0.013] -0.001 [-0.013,0.010] 0.001 [-0.005,0.008]
β33 0.001 [-0.003,0.004] 0.001 [-0.002,0.004] -0.001 [-0.004,0.000]
δ1 -1.678 [-4.807,2.347] -4.381 [-7.473,-0.846] -3.307 [-5.343,-1.122]
δ2 0.820 [-1.730,3.045] 2.272 [-0.244,4.200] 1.645 [-0.389,2.898]
δ11 0.179 [-0.141,0.571] -0.029 [-0.301,0.264] -0.043 [-0.253,0.171]
δ12 -0.001 [-0.372,0.318] 0.095 [-0.182,0.331] 0.083 [-0.075,0.235]
δ22 -0.077 [-0.443,0.343] -0.150 [-0.419,0.177] -0.204 [-0.381,-0.031]
η11 0.170 [-0.110,0.416] 0.319 [0.015,0.547] 0.235 [0.072,0.394]
η12 0.123 [-0.071,0.319] 0.036 [-0.144,0.223] 0.111 [-0.009,0.226]
η21 0.005 [-0.115,0.140] -0.044 [-0.154,0.075] -0.030 [-0.107,0.044]
η22 -0.124 [-0.272,0.008] -0.090 [-0.207,0.028] -0.114 [-0.188,-0.034]
η31 -0.009 [-0.029,0.017] -0.016 [-0.033,0.005] -0.009 [-0.020,0.003]
η32 -0.006 [-0.023,0.013] 0.004 [-0.014,0.020] -0.003 [-0.014,0.008]
κ1 -0.336 [-1.018,0.411] -0.543 [-1.096,0.015] -0.511 [-0.849,-0.169]
κ2 0.007 [-0.013,0.028] -0.005 [-0.019,0.010] -0.001 [-0.011,0.009]
φ1 0.066 [0.010,0.119] 0.083 [0.033,0.127] 0.078 [0.043,0.109]
φ2 -0.023 [-0.055,0.014] -0.022 [-0.049,0.009] -0.030 [-0.051,-0.009]
φ3 -0.003 [-0.007,0.000] -0.002 [-0.006,0.000] -0.002 [-0.003,-0.001]
ϕ1 0.049 [-0.021,0.128] 0.044 [-0.010,0.101] 0.024 [-0.008,0.057]
ϕ2 -0.054 [-0.136,0.030] -0.052 [-0.107,0.005] -0.044 [-0.073,-0.013]
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Table A.2: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the frontier parameter distributions
in profit models
Model P1 Model P2 Model P3
No risk covariates Common risk coefficients Random risk coefficients
Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI
β0 5.6560 [4.4570, 6.9950] 5.8790 [4.9180, 6.8760] 5.3440 [4.1010, 6.7390]
β1 0.0533 [0.0023, 0.1381] 0.0296 [0.0036, 0.0621] 0.0873 [0.0039, 0.1750]
β2 0.0927 [0.0015, 0.2178] 0.0792 [0.0070, 0.2172] 0.0401 [0.0015, 0.1079]
β3 0.0475 [0.0018, 0.1184] 0.0516 [0.0047, 0.1095] 0.0571 [0.0024, 0.1810]
β11 0.0712 [0.0192, 0.1282] 0.0780 [0.0292, 0.1290] 0.0873 [-0.0033, 0.1604]
β12 0.0186 [-0.0382, 0.0698] 0.0119 [-0.0388, 0.0597] 0.0022 [-0.0694, 0.0835]
β13 -0.0048 [-0.0110, 0.0008] -0.0044 [-0.0095, 0.0007] -0.0029 [-0.0099, 0.0034]
β22 0.0116 [-0.0350, 0.0591] 0.0157 [-0.0265, 0.0576] 0.0033 [-0.0754, 0.0694]
β23 0.0018 [-0.0021, 0.0057] 0.0015 [-0.0018, 0.0048] 0.0012 [-0.0029, 0.0054]
β33 0.0011 [-0.0009, 0.0031] 0.0010 [-0.0007, 0.0027] 0.0014 [-0.0003, 0.0032]
δ1 0.1544 [0.0046, 0.4351] 0.1484 [0.0108, 0.3585] 0.0959 [0.0034, 0.2848]
δ2 0.1802 [0.0065, 0.6177] 0.1726 [0.0126, 0.4098] 0.1515 [0.0050, 0.4716]
δ11 0.2195 [0.0861, 0.3221] 0.1866 [0.0581, 0.2884] 0.0397 [-0.1571, 0.2172]
δ12 -0.2212 [-0.3014, -0.1322] -0.2062 [-0.2777, -0.1289] -0.1467 [-0.2555, -0.034]
δ22 0.2010 [0.0978, 0.3008] 0.1857 [0.0980, 0.2720] 0.1831 [0.0751, 0.2814]
η11 0.1508 [0.0996, 0.2006] 0.1492 [0.1040, 0.1930] 0.1623 [0.0868, 0.2325]
η12 -0.0298 [-0.0766, 0.0154] -0.0289 [-0.0680, 0.0113] -0.0354 [-0.0929, 0.0279]
η21 -0.0175 [-0.0744, 0.0267] -0.0283 [-0.0858, 0.0165] -0.0979 [-0.1702, -0.0233]
η22 -0.0836 [-0.1286, -0.0365] -0.0752 [-0.1165, -0.0324] -0.0439 [-0.1008, 0.0130]
η31 0.0012 [-0.0059, 0.0094] 0.0017 [-0.0042, 0.0080] 0.0033 [-0.0035, 0.0117]
η32 0.0035 [-0.0040, 0.0103] 0.0023 [-0.0043, 0.0083] -0.0016 [-0.0104, 0.0057]
κ1 -0.3458 [-0.5945, -0.0978] -0.3589 [-0.5671, -0.1485] -0.3092 [-0.5264, -0.0984]
κ2 0.0022 [-0.0070, 0.0111] 0.0022 [-0.0054, 0.0096] 0.0051 [-0.0025, 0.0125]
φ1 0.0364 [0.0141, 0.0591] 0.0373 [0.0184, 0.0562] 0.0364 [0.0184, 0.0562]
φ2 -0.0344 [-0.0513, -0.0179] -0.0349 [-0.0489, -0.0209] -0.0359 [-0.0489, -0.0209]
φ3 0.0002 [-0.0013, 0.0018] 0.0001 [-0.0012, 0.0013] -0.0006 [-0.0012, 0.0013]
ϕ1 -0.0401 [-0.0680, -0.0127] -0.0417 [-0.0653, -0.0184] -0.0388 [-0.0651, -0.0131]
ϕ2 0.0167 [-0.0067, 0.0408] 0.0166 [-0.0029, 0.0364] 0.0099 [-0.0105, 0.0314]
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